Hedge funds: what are the main issues? by Noyer, C.
Banque de France • Financial Stability Review – Special issue on hedge funds • No. 10 • April 2007  105




The health and dynamism of modern ﬁ  nancial markets strongly depend on the existence of innovative 
and risk taking investors and institutions. Hedge funds play an important role in fostering market efﬁ  ciency 
and stability. 
The theoretical value added brought by hedge funds may, however, not fully materialize in practice, looking 
at their performances, but hedge funds investors should be able to make informed judgments.
The speciﬁ  c role and market impact of hedge funds may increase the potential for market manipulation and 
market abuse. However, hedge funds are not fundamentally different, in this regard, from other investors: 
strong and efﬁ  cient implementation of existing rules and procedures should be adequate and sufﬁ  cient to 
preserve market integrity.
It is an open question whether stronger “governance” requirements should be introduced for those hedge 
funds indirectly collecting retail investors’ money, either through professional codes of conducts, market 
mechanisms reinforced by a “rating” process or more compulsory and binding regulations. One of the issues 
that could be considered is whether and how to eventually encourage hedge funds to apply the set of best 
practices for asset valuation proposed by the International Organization of Securities Commissions.
Hedge funds’ activities may have implications for systemic risk, both through potential losses to their bank 
creditors and through adverse market dynamics that might in turn affect banks. Potential mitigating actions 
should take into account these two aspects. First, appropriate intervention by the supervisors on the prime 
brokers to make sure that they ask and get broad information from hedge funds and that they put in place 
a comprehensive risk management of all hedge funds related exposures is essential. Second, there might 
be scope for policy makers to encourage appropriate organization of infrastructure in order to improve the 
information available on the markets in which hedge funds operate. Finally, authorities may explore how to 
devise processes giving them, on a case by case basis, access to relevant information about hedge fund 
exposures and positions.ARTICLES
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edge funds play an increasingly active 
role in many ﬁ  nancial markets. They have 
recently, attracted a lot of attention. This 
article seeks to highlight some of the main issues 
which seem worth considering in the light of the 
current international debate on hedge funds.
1| THE ROLE OF HEDGE FUNDS
IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
1|1  Hedge funds and market efﬁ  ciency,
  liquidity and stability
Any discussion should start with a clear recognition of 
the beneﬁ  ts brought by hedge funds to ﬁ  nancial market 
efﬁ  ciency, as well as an acknowledgement of the fact 
that most / some of those beneﬁ  ts would not exist if 
hedge funds were directly and speciﬁ  cally regulated.
Market efﬁ  ciency requires that prices reﬂ  ect at any 
time all the information available to investors. That, in 
turn, means that all proﬁ  table arbitrage opportunities 
can be permanently exploited, including between 
assets with different risk characteristics.
Market efﬁ  ciency depends on “technical” conditions 
i.e. the ability for supply and demand for ﬁ  nancial 
instruments to meet through an appropriate 
infrastructure. Technical efﬁ  ciency is a necessary 
but not sufﬁ  cient condition. Economic efﬁ  ciency 
also requires that some market participants are 
willing to incur (sometimes) signiﬁ  cant costs to 
gather information and, then, take the risk to act on 
this information with the hope of making a proﬁ  t. 
Those actions move markets and, as such, ensure 
that prices do reﬂ  ect available information. This 
process of “price discovery” rests upon the ability of 
some investors to hold proprietary information and 
be able to take advantage of it. This means that there 
are pockets of inefﬁ  ciency in the markets which can 
be exploited by informed investors. In other words, 
–this is a well known paradox1– , a market is efﬁ  cient 
only if some investors believe it is inefﬁ  cient.
This is the basic rationale against forcing hedge funds to be 
publicly transparent about their positions and strategies. 
Hedge funds have an edge in fostering ﬁ  nancial 
innovation, as shown by their signiﬁ  cant involvement 
in complex and innovative markets (e.g. structured 
credit). A signiﬁ  cant part of their research goes 
into devising new strategies and products aimed at 
packaging, distributing and holding risk.
Hedge funds bring to the market investors with a 
presumably higher –in any case different– propension 
to take risks. As such they increase the risk taking 
capacity available in the ﬁ   nancial system and 
contribute to a better allocation of these risks.
Heterogeneity of investors is good for market stability. 
If all players had homogeneous risk proﬁ  les and 
preferences, markets would barely trade. To the extent 
that hedge funds exhibit “different” risk proﬁ  les and 
risk aversion, –and they have speciﬁ  c analytical and 
informational capabilities– they may act as “contrarians” 
when prices move away from equilibrium and help 
and stabilize ﬁ  nancial markets by providing, in those 
circumstances, additional liquidity.
1|2 Mixed evidence on the theoretical
 beneﬁ  ts of hedge funds
The many theoretical beneﬁ  ts of hedge funds, as 
described above, may fail to materialize in practice. 
A whole body of research has been devoted to 
look at hedge funds performance. The results are 
not all conclusive, in part due to data availability 
and reliability. Reporting to third-party databases 
computing aggregate hedge fund returns is voluntary, 
and their results may be affected by survival bias. 
There may be doubt, nevertheless, as to whether 
some investment strategies implemented by hedge 
funds deliver true diversiﬁ  cation as well as a better 
risk / return over the long run.
According to some estimates, a stronger correlation 
between hedge funds returns in recent years 
points to great similarities in investment strategies. 
Correlations between those returns and equity 
market performances (and even perhaps ﬁ  xed 
income market yields and currency carry trade 
returns) create doubts about the “absolute return” 
characteristic of hedge funds as well as their 
contribution to effective portfolio diversiﬁ  cation.
1  Grossman (S.) and Stiglitz (J.) (1980): “On the impossibility of informationally efﬁ  cient markets”, American Economic Review 70 (3), JuneARTICLES
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It is thus not clear, in some cases, that superior returns 
are obtained through truly innovative portfolio 
selection (delivering alpha, or “out performance”) 
rather than simply by taking in more systematic 
risk (exploiting beta). In the latter case, the issue 
of whether fees taken by hedge funds managers 
(typically 2% of assets managed plus 20% of proﬁ  ts) 
are always met with commensurate returns arises. 
Such a fee structure may also create a bias towards 
“fat tail” investment strategies (such as selling put 
options) delivering high returns most of the time 
with a small probability of huge losses.
These problems, however serious they may 
be, do not, by themselves, make a case for any 
kind of  regulation. Investors in hedge funds are 
–or should be– able to make informed judgments. To 
the extent that hedge fund managers are extracting 
abnormal remunerations, these should be progressively 
challenged and eliminated through increased 
competition. Indeed, several investment banks are 
now starting to sell synthetic instruments replicating 
hedge fund strategies and, hopefully, producing similar 
returns at signiﬁ  cantly lower costs for investors.
2| HEDGE-FUND-RELATED RISKS
FOR THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
2|1 Investor  protection
High net worth individuals are still predominant 
among hedge funds’ investors, but hedge funds 
now tap into a larger share of household savings 
that is channeled through institutional investors 
(mainly funds of funds and pension funds). 
The latter now amounts to around 30% of the 
investor base. Traditionally, direct investment 
in hedge funds used to be accessible only to 
wealthy investors, due to high entry tickets 
(e.g. 100,000 dollars or more). Some jurisdictions 
(e.g. France) actually impose high quantitative 
barriers for direct hedge fund investment 
(from 125,000 to 250,000  euros). However, 
the development of the fund of hedge funds 
industry has blurred this type of barrier, and 
has lowered signiﬁ  cantly the entry ticket for an 
indirect exposure to hedge funds. As part of a 
similar trend, pension funds have increased their 
allocation to alternative investments (including 
hedge funds).
By itself, “retailisation”, namely increased participation 
of retail investors in hedge funds, does not make 
a case for speciﬁ  c regulation of hedge funds, providing, 
however, that appropriate investor protection 
measures are taken independently. For fund of funds, 
particular care should be given to the conditions 
of their authorization, and their rules for governance, 
asset allocation, and due diligence. For pension funds, 
the responsibility and control of trustees could be 
reinforced.
However, even after accounting for such investor 
protection measures, another concern is about the 
valuation processes in hedge funds, especially for 
complex or illiquid ﬁ  nancial instruments. Hedge funds 
frequently invest in assets that are complex or illiquid 
by nature or in more liquid assets but in such amounts 
that their positions sometimes become difﬁ  cult to 
value. Besides, since managers’ remuneration is based 
on the mark-to-market, or more often mark-to-model, 
proﬁ  ts at the end of the year, overoptimistic valuation 
of positions may prove very tempting. In other terms, 
given the incentive structure of hedge fund managers, 
their interests are not necessarily perfectly and 
permanently aligned with those of their investors. It is 
thus not clear how to reconcile the two objectives of, on 
the one hand, giving hedge funds’ managers sufﬁ  cient 
leeway to value their most complex assets, and on 
the other hand, ensuring the integrity of valuation, 
especially when retail money is (indirectly) involved.
2|2 Market integrity
Regarding market integrity, which relates to market 
abuse and insider trading, actual risks exist. They are 
not per se speciﬁ  c to –but can develop more easily 
within– hedge funds. Insider information may not be 
adequately managed in hedge funds, partly because 
they are not subject to “Chinese walls” or similar 
rules. Conﬂ  icts of interest may arise if a hedge fund 
is engaged across markets, and is tempted to use 
in one market an information obtained from his 
involvement in another (e.g. hedge funds engaged 
in private equity may use information to trade 
on credit markets). In addition, hedge funds have 
become dominant in some markets (e.g. structured 
credit) and might be able to manipulate prices.ARTICLES
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However, hedge funds are not fundamentally 
different, in this regard, from other investors: strong 
and efﬁ  cient implementation of existing rules and 
procedures should be adequate and sufﬁ  cient to 
preserve market integrity. Implementation issues may 
complicate the issue, though, especially since hedge 
funds are active in relatively opaque market segments 
and on complicated cross-market operations which 
cannot be easily screened by market supervisors.
2|3 Systemic risk
Systemic risk occurs whenever failure of one individual 
institution can trigger very adverse consequences for 
a signiﬁ  cant number of other institutions. There are 
many possible transmission channels: 
•  through an increase in counterparty risk as 
failure of one entity can endanger the viability of 
its counterparties, thus starting a chain effect;
• through a reduction in market liquidity because, 
to prevent default, a ﬁ  nancial institution may start 
selling assets and liquidating positions, an action 
susceptible of creating brutal price adjustments; if 
other institutions are marked to market, they will 
themselves engage in further liquidations, thus 
aggravating the impact of the initial shock;
• through “pure” contagion triggered, for instance, 
by a general reassessment of risk inside an asset 
class of through a wide range of asset classes.
From that point of view, it is clear that hedge funds 
potentially might present signiﬁ  cant and speciﬁ  c 
risks. To start with, they are major –often dominant– 
actors in several important market segments. They 
account for around 40% of the turnover of major 
stock exchanges. They are prominent participants in 
credit markets (27% of investors in high yield bonds 
according to The Bond Market Association, a quarter 
of credit derivatives turnover according to Fitch). 
More than other investors, hedge funds pursue 
global, cross-market strategies, and may increase the 
linkages (positive and negative) of markets across 
countries and asset classes.
In some cases, hedge fund activity may result in 
one-way markets and higher volatility in less liquid 
market segments, particularly during periods of 
stress. Since hedge funds heavily support liquidity 
in some markets, liquidity may dry up very 
rapidly, should they decide to withdraw and close 
their positions simultaneously.2 Furthermore, 
they can leverage themselves with very high 
multiples either directly (through borrowing from 
prime brokers) or indirectly (through intensive 
selling of credit derivatives). They may thus be 
especially vulnerable to a sudden decrease in 
market liquidity. Last but not least, hedge funds 
keep close and permanent business relations 
with large banks, which are central actors in the 
ﬁ  nancial system.
Apart from the “lender of last resort” intervention 
(which will not be discussed here), the best protection 
against systemic risk rests on two preventive “pillars”: 
a strong capital base for major market participants 
and efﬁ  cient risk management.
Hedge funds have no capital base of their own but 
can rely on their investors’ capital. Lock up periods 
(typically one to two years) help stabilizing the 
ﬁ  nancial system in times of stress since capital is 
“constrained” to remain available and absorb shocks. 
A further buffer is provided by margin and collateral 
requirements imposed on hedge funds by prime 
brokers, which should insulate lending banks from 
any difﬁ  culties suffered by their hedge funds clients. 
Finally, banks have a strong incentive in fostering 
comprehensive and accurate risk management 
systems at their client hedge funds.
Those two pillars form a very solid base for an efﬁ  cient 
market discipline on hedge funds’ risk taking and 
activity. They have worked well in recent episodes. 
The most recent examples of hedge fund-related 
turbulences (the May 2005 crisis on credit markets 
and the Amaranth demise in September 2006) are a 
case in point.
However, those episodes have taken place in very 
benign economic conditions, and the impact of 
hedge funds difﬁ  culties on ﬁ  nancial stability could 
be different in a less favourable environment.
2  A case in point is May 2005 where a number of hedge funds tried to unwind similar positions on Credit default swap (CDS) index tranches, causing temporary but 
still widespread dislocation, before other hedge funds entered the market to exploit the mispricings created by this situation.ARTICLES
Christian Noyer: “Hedge funds: what are the main issues?”
Banque de France • Financial Stability Review – Special issue on hedge funds • No. 10 • April 2007  109
In addition, several actual or potential fragilities can 
be detected in the way market discipline presently 
works. Some of the mechanisms devised to protect 
individual institutions could increase, rather than 
reduce, some aspects of systemic risk in time of stress. 
Margin calls, while guaranteeing lenders against any 
possible loss, can force widespread liquidation of 
assets and positions by hedge funds in falling markets, 
especially in a context of fair value accounting thus 
increasing the risk of contagion through withdrawal 
of liquidity and market instability.
Another concern is that the capital buffer of hedge 
funds could be rapidly exhausted in stress situations 
if their leverage ratio is high, as shown by the failure 
of the Long-term capital Management (LTCM) fund 
in 1998. It does not seem to be the case at the moment, 
as anecdotal evidence suggests that leverage remains 
limited compared to the pre-LTCM period. But it is 
increasing. Besides, effective leverage has become 
notoriously difﬁ  cult to measure, due to the difﬁ  culty 
in capturing the effect of different layers of leverage, 
and in particular the leverage embedded in the most 
complex forms of credit derivatives.3
A last important concern is that the relationship 
between hedge funds and their prime brokers is 
complex and fragile. Prime brokers’ incentives are 
not always perfectly aligned with the requirements 
of proper market discipline, as these entities depend 
on hedge funds for a very signiﬁ  cant part of their 
revenue. If no pressure were exerted by banking 
supervisors, competition between prime brokers to 
get hedge funds’ clientele could lead to a relatively 
weak enforcement of risk monitoring and market 
discipline. Furthermore, many hedge funds deal 
with several prime brokers, none of which getting 
automatically a comprehensive view of their 
activities, risk proﬁ  le, and exposures. Finally, hedge 
funds and prime brokers might be competitors on 
many activities, and ﬁ  nd themselves on opposite 
sides of the market. This creates inherent conﬂ  icts 
of interest and puts some limitations on the quantity 
and quality of information that can productively be 
exchanged between them.
3| SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
From the preceding analysis, it emerges that 
two important questions might be highlighted to 
frame the debate on hedge funds.
3|1 The consequences of increased
  involvement of retail investors 
  in hedge funds
On the one hand, existing rules and procedures 
for investor protection should provide the basis for 
effective regulation in this ﬁ  eld. On the other hand, 
it is not clear how those rules can always be made 
compatible with the non transparent environment 
in which hedge funds necessarily operate. It is 
an open question whether stronger “governance” 
requirements should be introduced for those hedge 
funds indirectly collecting retail investors’ money, 
either through professional codes of conducts, 
market mechanisms reinforced by a “rating” process 
or more compulsory and binding regulations. In 
this light, the work of International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to develop a 
set of best practices for the valuation of hedge fund 
assets seems very promising.4 In order to encourage 
hedge funds to apply them, banking supervisors 
could take them into account in their requirements 
vis-à-vis prime brokers.
3|2 The  implications 
  of hedge funds’ activities 
  for systemic risk
Potential risks arise both directly through the potential 
losses that prime brokers could incur as a result of 
their exposures to hedge funds, but also indirectly 
through adverse market dynamics triggered by hedge 
funds (for instance market liquidity disturbances due 
to disorderly portfolio liquidation). Such dynamics 
3  As a striking illustration, let’s imagine that 100 of cash are invested in a fund of hedge funds. This is total capital. Then, this hedge fund borrows 200 and invests 
the capital and the borrowed money (i.e. 300) in another hedge fund. This other hedge fund borrows again 300 and invests the total (i.e. 600) in a subordinated 
Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) tranche, which is typically leveraged 10 times. Overall, the total exposure of the fund of hedge fund is 6,000 but the share of 
capital is still 100, i.e. a leverage of 60 times! With such a pyramid of leverage, a fall of 2% in the value of assets is enough to wipe out the entire capital.
4  Within a group bringing together regulators and representatives of the alternative management industry, IOSCO has suggested standard procedures in the area 
of hedge funds valuation and assigned responsibilities in the valuation process among all concerned parties: the prime broker, the depositary, the auditor and, 
naturally, the manager. It has published a series of guiding principles which professionals will be encouraged to apply to themselves.ARTICLES
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might seriously affect banks, even if they had managed 
their counterparty risks carefully. Therefore, the 
challenge is not only to foster market discipline in 
the hedge fund –prime broker relationship, although 
this is key and remains a precondition, but also to 
prevent, or at least mitigate, the effects of potential 
adverse market dynamics.
Financial markets have undergone signiﬁ  cant 
structural changes since the 2000 Report on Highly 
Leveraged Institutions. These changes basically 
come to the simple observation that market 
dynamics are increasingly dissociated from banking 
intermediation. The distribution and allocation of 
risk –hence liquidity– takes place more and more 
outside banks’ balance sheets, although banks keep 
a central role in the ﬁ  nancial system through the 
“originate and distribute” model.
A ﬁ  rst change is the growth of securitization and 
credit derivatives, which have facilitated the 
dispersion of credit risk across ﬁ  rms and across 
sectors of the ﬁ  nancial system. However, it has 
also made markets more opaque, complicating the 
identiﬁ  cation of the ultimate bearers of risk and the 
interlinkages between various market segments.
In connection with the growth of derivatives, the means 
used to create leverage in the ﬁ  nancial system have 
expanded and diversiﬁ  ed beyond the banking sector. In 
particular, the importance of “embedded” instrument 
leverage (e.g. the case of CDOs) has increased, 
allowing for the accumulation of different layers of 
leverage and hence new forms of risk concentration.
Finally, new valuation challenges for complex 
ﬁ  nancial instruments have emerged. The models 
used to measure exposure and price risk in the 
newest and often illiquid instruments are, by 
deﬁ  nition, less grounded in experience.
Those structural changes have taken place so far in 
a very benign ﬁ  nancial environment characterized 
by ample liquidity, broad based rise in asset prices 
and subdued volatility. Admittedly, risk management 
techniques have also improved markedly, in a 
continuous effort to adapt to this new environment. 
However, the current ﬁ  nancial system remains 
essentially an untested world in stress situations.
In such a new –and fast evolving– ﬁ  nancial landscape, 
it is not easy to ﬁ  gure out how a hedge fund related 
crisis would look like. It often takes a combination of 
causes to account for the potential reasons for a crisis. 
Therefore, we need to maintain a degree of humility 
and caution about our capacity to anticipate the nature 
and dynamics of future stresses to the ﬁ  nancial system, 
in particular as regards the concentration of risk and 
the existence of crowded trades. However, the practical 
question of who needs to know what and when, in order 
to minimize systemic risk and cope efﬁ  ciently with it 
when it materializes, cannot be so easily discarded.
To this end, two avenues can be explored: 
• Improving the information available on the markets in 
which hedge funds operate. One of the intrinsic strengths 
of markets with organized infrastructure when compared 
with markets which are totally over-the-counter (OTC) 
is their capacity to record transactions in a centralized 
manner and in a “seamless” way, thanks to advanced 
technology. Therefore, it is easier to know what the 
main participants are doing without having to put in 
place a heavy reporting scheme, which would otherwise 
be needed in an OTC market to get such information. 
The example of the credit derivative market is very 
relevant, as the implementation of a “data warehouse”5
will probably yield precious information for ﬁ  nancial 
stability, even though that was not the initial purpose. 
There might be scope for policymakers to encourage 
such “organization” of infrastructure in certain market 
segments or platforms that are deemed relevant for 
ﬁ  nancial stability, like the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York did for OTC derivatives, and to encourage 
hedge funds to use such “organized” markets. This 
would also be beneﬁ  cial for the prevention of market 
abuse and insider trading.
• Devising processes to obtain relevant information 
for crisis management. In order to use wisely and 
efﬁ  ciently their crisis management tools without 
creating moral hazard, authorities may need to 
get access to critical information at a certain time. 
One avenue to explore would be, for authorities, 
to devise processes giving them, on a case by case 
basis, access to relevant information about hedge 
funds. There might be value in making sure ex ante 
that speciﬁ  c information about hedge funds can be 
gathered easily and quickly if needed.
5  Work has been undertaken under the aegis of the G10 Committee for Payment and Settlement System (CPSS) concerning the infrastructure of OTC derivatives 
markets and how it can be strengthened.ARTICLES
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Finally, such avenues would not be as effective 
if they were not preceded by a stronger grip by 
supervisors on the relationship between hedge funds 
and prime brokers. In particular, supervisors should 
and do insist that prime brokers ask and get sufﬁ  cient 
information from hedge funds in order not only to 
assess their own risk, but get a broader view of all 
implications deriving, through ﬁ  nancial markets, of 
their clients’ activities (including through the use 
of stress tests). This “indirect supervision” approach 
is the least intrusive and also the most effective in 
the short term, in particular at the international 
level. Implementation of the pillar II of the Basel II 
agreement will give banking supervisors additional 
tools in that respect.